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Abstract
We propose a class of quantum no-key protocols for private communication
of classical message based on quantum computing of random Boolean permu-
tations, and demonstrate that they are information-theoretic secure. These
protocols are designed to resist middleman attack for two parties preshared
authentication key, and achieve perfect mutual data origin authentication
which ensures the permanent reusing of authentication key. Finally, we sim-
plify the protocol to a 4-round one, and show that any protocol with 3 or less
rounds cannot achieve perfect security without consuming preshared key.
Keywords: quantum cryptography, information-theoretic security,
quantum no-key protocol, data origin authentication
Quantum no-key protocol is one of the earliest interactive quantum se-
cure communication protocols[1–3], which remains three-round structure of
Shamir’s original idea, but can be improved to resist man-in-the-middle
(MIM) attack[2, 4, 5]. This kind of protocols have been applied to meet var-
ious cryptographic demands[7–10]. When the communication is limited to
transmitting classical message, and we do not require it to keep exponential-
security under the MIM attack, a protocol can be simplified to a two-round
one[11]. So far, there are various quantum no-key protocols presented [5], but
none with rigorous security proof. Here we propose a new quantum no-key
protocol for classical message communication with provable perfect security.
1. Basic protocol
Alice intends to transmit classical message x to Bob through a quantum
channel. She can complement it by the following protocol:
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Protocol 1.
(1) Alice prepares quantum state:
|x〉I H
(n)−→ 1√
2n
∑
m
(−1)x·m|m〉I . (1)
(2) Alice chooses a Boolean permutation FA(·) randomly, and executes:
1√
2n
∑
m
(−1)x·m|m〉I |0〉II → 1√
2n
∑
m
(−1)x·m|m〉I |FA(m)〉II . (2)
(3) Alice sends quantum register I to Bob, the state appeared in the channel
is:
ρ1 = trII
[
1
2n
∑
m,n
(−1)x·m(−1)x·n|m〉I〈n| ⊗ |FA(m)〉II〈FA(n)|
]
=
1
2n
∑
m,n
(−1)x·m(−1)x·n|m〉I〈n|
∑
k
〈k|FA(m)〉〈FA(n)|k〉. (3)
Since FA(·) is a Boolean permutation, we have:
ρ1 =
1
2n
∑
m
|m〉〈m| = 1
2n
I2n . (4)
That is, the state appeared on the channel is only an ultimate mixed
state.
(4) After receiving the quantum state ρ1, Bob randomly chooses a Boolean
permutation FB(·) and computes:
|m〉I |0〉III → |m〉I |FB(m)〉III . (5)
Then, the state of quantum register I will be:
ρ2 = trIII
[
1
2n
∑
m
|m〉I〈m| ⊗ |FB(m)〉III〈FB(m)|
]
=
1
2n
∑
m
|m〉I〈m| ⊗
∑
k
〈k|FB(m)〉III〈FB(m)|k〉III
=
1
2n
I2n . (6)
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That is, while Bob sending the quantum register I to Alice, the state in
the channel is also an ultimate mixed state.
(5) After received register I, Alice does computation:
|m〉I |FA(m)〉II → |m〉I |FA(m)⊕ FA(m)〉II
= |m〉I |0〉II , (7)
and sends register I to Bob again. Then the state transmitted in the
channel will be:
ρ3 = trII
[
1
2n
∑
m
|m〉I〈m||0〉II〈0|
]
=
1
2n
I2n . (8)
The transmitted state is an ultimate mixed state again.
(6) After received ρ3, Bob executes computation:
|m〉I |FB(m)〉II → |m〉I |FB(m)⊕ FB(m)〉II
= |m〉I |0〉II , (9)
and obtains the state: 1√
2n
∑
m
(−1)x·m|m〉I . Finally, Bob has the message
x via performing H(n) transformation and measuring register I.
It can be seen more clearly if we exhibit the whole evolution of (A,B) com-
posite system:
1√
2n
∑
m
(−1)x·m|m〉I |0〉II |0〉III
→ 1√
2n
∑
m
(−1)x·m|m〉I |FA(m)〉II |0〉III
→ 1√
2n
∑
m
(−1)x·m|m〉I |FA(m)〉II |FB(m)〉III
3
→ 1√
2n
∑
m
(−1)x·m|m〉I |FA(m)⊕ |FA(m)〉II |FB(m)〉III
=
1√
2n
∑
m
(−1)x·m|m〉I |0〉II |FB(m)〉III
→ 1√
2n
∑
m
(−1)x·m|m〉I |0〉II |FB(m)⊕ FB(m)〉III
=
1√
2n
∑
m
(−1)x·m|m〉I |0〉II |0〉III . (10)
That is, Bob obtains the quantum state of the first quantum register:
1√
2n
∑
m
(−1)x·m|m〉I .
.
With respect to secrecy, FA(·), FB(·) are both randomly selected Boolean
permutation, and the transmitted quantum states ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 are all ultimate
mixed states, so the adversary can not get any information, protocol 1 has
information-theoretic security. However, this protocol cannot resist MIM
attack. When that the adversary Eve impersonates Bob to communicate
with Alice, at the same time, he impersonates Alice to communicate with
Bob, he will get x from Alice and send x
′
to Bob successfully.
2. Protocol with data origin authentication
In this section, we improve protocol 1 to be one with mutual authenti-
cation. The protocol we shall construct is a 9-round no-key protocol with
mutual identification. The whole protocol consists of three stages, each in-
cludes three rounds.
Protocol 2.
Alice and Bob share randomly chosen Boolean functions sA(·) and sB(·)
in advance.
(1) Alice randomly chooses Boolean permutation FA(·) and random number
rA, then prepares quantum state:∑
m
αm|m〉I |0〉II |0〉III →
∑
m
αm|m〉I |FA(m)〉II |sA(m)⊕ rA〉III(11)
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where αm =
1√
2n
(−1)x·m, then Alice sends the first and the third registers
to Bob. For the adversary, the quantum state transmitted in the channel
is:
σ1 = trII
[ ∑
m,n,rA
αmα
∗
n
2l
|m〉〈n| ⊗ |FA(m)〉〈FA(n)| ⊗ |sA(m)⊕ rA〉〈sA(n)⊕ rA|
]
=
1
2l
∑
m,rA
|αm|2|m〉〈m| ⊗ |sA(m)⊕ rA〉〈sA(m)⊕ rA|
=
1
2l
∑
m
|αm|2|m〉〈m| ⊗ I2l
=
1
2l+n
I2n ⊗ I2l
=
1
2n+l
I2n+l (12)
Therefore, σ1 is an ultimate mixed state.
(2) Bob randomly chooses Boolean permutation FB(·) and random number
rB, then uses FB(·), rB and the preshared Boolean function sB(·) to
accomplish computation:
|m〉I |sA(m)⊕ rA〉III |0〉IV |0〉V
→ |m〉I |rA〉III |FB(m)〉IV |sB(m)⊕ rB〉V . (13)
Then Bob measures the third quantum register and sends the first and
the fifth register to Alice. Similar to the analysis in step (1), we can see
that quantum state σ2 in the channel is also an ultimate mixed state.
(3) Alice chooses random number rA′ and do the transformation:
|m〉I |FA(m)〉II |sB(m)⊕ rB〉V |0〉V I
→ |m〉I |FA(m)⊕ FA(m)〉II |sB(m)⊕ sB(m)⊕ rB〉V |sA(m)⊕ rA′ 〉V I
= |m〉I |0〉II |rB〉V |sA(m)⊕ rA′ 〉V I . (14)
Then Alice measures the fifth quantum register, and sends register I
and register V I to Bob. It can also be proved that the quantum state
appeared in channel is σ3 =
1
2n+l
I2n+l .
(4) After he receives σ3, Bob executes transformation:
|m〉I |FB(m)〉IV |sA(m)⊕ r′A〉V I
→ |m〉I |FB(m)⊕ FB(m)〉IV |sA(m)⊕ sA(m)⊕ r′A〉V I
= |m〉I |0〉IV |r′A〉V I , (15)
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and obtains the quantum state : 1√
2n
∑
m
(−1)x·m|m〉.
(5) Bob performs Hadamard transformation on the received quantum state,
and measures the quantum register I. Finally, he obtains the classical
message x.
There exists an obvious weakness in the above protocol. Though Eve
cannot obtain x, she can tamper the system without being detected. A direct
way to resist this attack is to execute the protocol three times as follows:
Protocol 3.
(1) The first stage (1-3 rounds): Alice sends classical message x to Bob via
executing protocol 2. We can see that, for Eve without sA(·) and sB(·),
obtaining the message x is a too difficult task to accomplish.
(2) The second stage (4-6 rounds): Bob sends the message x back to Alice
via protocol 2. We can see that even if Eve impersonates Bob to com-
municate with Alice, she cannot send back the right x to Alice, and then
Alice will find that she has not accomplished the communication task.
(3) The third stage (7-9 rounds): Alice sends x to Bob again via protocol 2.
If Eve impersonates Alice to communicate with Bob, Bob will receive two
different messages in this and the first stage respectively, because Eve
does not have sA and sB. Thererfore, via this stage, Bob can discriminate
the attacker from the expected message sender Alice.
The interaction of this protocol is up to 9 so as to achieve perfect secu-
rity. Since all the quantum states transmitted are ultimate mixed states, the
adversary cannot get any information.
(1) For different message x and y, the quantum states in the channel are
all the ultimate mixed state, so the trace distance of ρi(x) and ρj(y)
(i = 1, 2, 3) is:
D(ρi(x), ρj(y)) = 0 (16)
Therefore, Eve cannot attack the plaintext directly.
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(2) For Alice and Bob’s authentication Boolean function sA, sB, due to rA
and rB are local random bit strings chosen for each round independently,
we have:
D(ρi(x, sA(·)), ρj(y, s′A(·)) = D(ρi(x, sB(·)), ρj(y, s
′
B(·)) = D(
I2n+l
2n+l
,
I2n+l
2n+l
) = 0 (17)
That is, the adversary cannot attack sA, sB.
Though this 9-round protocol is constructed so complicated, there
still exists a MIM attack. The adversary can perform Zx operation to
quantum register I in each of the 9 passes: Zx
′ |m〉 = (−1)x′ ·m|m〉. This
attack will change the final message Bob recieved from x to x⊕ x′ . We
can easily understand this attack from the basic relation HX = ZH.
To resist this attack, Alice and Bob have to use authentication key
to code x: x → ek(x). While Eve tampered, Alice and Bob will find
that the message received has been changed. That is, when we use
this additional authentication, Eve cannot implement her MIM attack
without being detected.
3. Simplification of the previous protocols
The protocol 2 can be simplified as follows:
Protocol 4.
(1) The message receiver Bob executes computation as below:
|0〉I |0〉II |0〉III → 1√
2n
∑
m
|m〉I |0〉II |0〉III
→ 1√
2n
∑
m
|m〉I |FB(m)〉II |0〉III
→ 1√
2n
∑
m
|m〉I |FB(m)〉II |sB(m)⊕ rB〉III , (18)
where FB(·) is a randomly chosen Boolean permutation, sB is a Boolean
Function preshared by Alice and Bob for authentication, and rB is a
randomly chosen bit string. Then, Bob sends register I and III together
to Alice.
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(2) The message sender Alice executes computation:
|m〉I |sB(m)⊕ rB〉III → |m〉I |sB(m)⊕ sB(m)⊕ rB〉III
= |m〉I |rB〉III (19)
and measures the third register , then she performs quantum operation
Zx to register I: Zx|m〉I = (−1)x·m|m〉I , and executes computation:
|m〉I |0〉IV → |m〉I |sA(m) ⊕ rA〉IV . Then she sends the two registers to
Bob. Where sA is another Boolean function preshared by Alice and Bob
for authentication, and rA is a bit-string randomly chosen by Alice.
(3) Bob computes:
|m〉I |sA(m)⊕ rA〉IV → |m〉I |sA(m)⊕ sA(m)⊕ rA〉IV
= |m〉I |rA〉IV , (20)
and measures the register IV , then he computes:
|m〉I |FB(m)〉II → |m〉I |FB(m)⊕ FB(m)〉II
= |m〉I |0〉II , (21)
and obtains the quantum state:
1√
2n
∑
m
(−1)x·m|m〉I H
(n)−→ |x〉I (22)
Finally, Bob measures the register I and results in the message x from
Alice.
Because FB(·) is a Boolean permutation, we can prove as in protocol 2 that
the two quantum states transmitting in channel are both ultimate mixed
states. Based on this results, the protocol 3 can be simplified to a 6-round
protocol with mutual authentication:
Protocol 5.
(1) Alice executes protocol 4 to send a message x to Bob;
(2) Bob executes protocol 4 to send x back to Alice;
(3) Alice executes protocol 4 with Bob to send x to Bob again.
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Via this three stage protocol, Alice can confirm that the message x is really
received by the expected receiver Bob, and Bob also acknowledges that the
message is really from the expected sender Alice. Actually, this protocol can
be simplified further to a 4-round one as follows:
Protocol 6.
(1) Alice encodes: x → ek(x) with some information-theoretic secure au-
thentication code, and executes the first step of protocol 5 to send
x
′
= (x, ek(x)) to Bob.
(2) Bob executes the second step of protocol 5, and sends ek(x) back to Alice.
It can be seen that since a classical authentication code ek is embedded in
the protocol, the 6-round protocol can be simplified to a 4-round one which
can resist the MIM attack with operation Zx.
4. Security analysis of protocols with 3 or less rounds
A. Non-interactive protocol
The sender Alice intends to send x to receiver Bob, she firstly computes
ek(x), the MAC of x, and gets x
′
= (x, ek(x)). Then she computes as below:
|x′〉 → 1√
2n
∑
m
(−1)x′ ·m|m〉I |0〉II
→ 1√
2n
∑
m
(−1)x′ ·m|m〉I |sA(m)⊕ rA〉II , (23)
and sends the two registers to Bob. For the adversary, the mixed state in
the channel is:
ρ =
1
N
∑
sA,rA
∑
m,n
(−1)m·x′⊕n·x′
2l
|m〉I〈n| ⊗ |sA(m)⊕ rA〉II〈sA(n)⊕ rA|
=
1
N2l
∑
m,n
(−1)m·x′⊕n·x′ |m〉I〈n| ⊗
∑
sA,rA
|sA(m)⊕ rA〉II〈sA(n)⊕ rA|(24)
Up till now, we cannot prove its security yet, though there is no effective
attack found.
B. Two-round protocol
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Two-round protocol is that includes only the first step of the 4-round pro-
tocol. Since D(ρi(x), ρj(y)) = 0, information-theoretic security can be guar-
anteed. Because D(ρi(x, sA(·)), ρj(y, s′A(·)) = 0, D(ρi(x, sB(·)), ρj(y, s′B(·)) =
0 authentication key sA(·) and sB(·) can be used permanently. However, in
this protocols, Alice cannot identify whether the message has been send to
Bob. As soon as Bob adds authentication message in the quantum state,
the protocol is no longer of provable information-theoretic security, and
lost the permanent reusable property of authentication key. The reason is
that because that the protocol cannot keep conditions: D(ρi(x), ρj(y)) = 0,
D(ρi(x, sA(·)), ρj(y, s′A(·)) = 0 in that case.
C. Three-round protocol
Three-round protocol can overcome the difficulty of the two-round proto-
col described above, and realize mutual authentication, but it cannot ensure
the permanent employment of authentication key. To satisfy the security re-
quirement mentioned above, the protocols introduced here compute random
Boolean permutation {FA(·), FB(·)} controlled by local random numbers to
produce entangled states, and use local random numbers rA, rB to protect
authentication keys sA(·), sB(·). It can be seen that the three-round protocol
cannot satisfy all these requirements.
In a three round protocol, the entangled state without message has to be
sent by Bob firstly. Then, Alice adds the message in the entangled state in the
way as in two-round protocol. As the security analysis in two-round protocol,
Alice cannot verify the legitimacy of Bob without consuming key, any further
authentication depends on the additional third round. It is difficult for the
third round to do that relies on entangled state which is produced by local
random number, so the leakage of authentication key is inevitable. Therefore,
three-round protocol cannot ensure the permanent use of authentication key
while guarantees perfect encryption and origin data authentication.
5. Conclusion
We propose a new kind of quantum no-key protocol with provable information-
theoretic security. We simplify the initial 9-round protocol to a 4-round
protocol, and shows that any protocol of this kind cannot ensure both the
security and the permanent employment of the authentication key if its num-
ber of rounds is less than or equal to 3.
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